As technology develops, it is only a matter of time before agents will be capable of long term autonomy, i.e., will need to choose their actions by themselves for a long period of time. Thus, in many cases agents will not be able to be coordinated in advance with all other agents with which they may interact. Instead, agents will need to cooperate in order to accomplish unanticipated joint goals without pre-coordination. As a result, the "ad hoc teamwork" problem, in which teammates must work together to obtain a common goal without any prior agreement regarding how to do so, has emerged as a recent area of study in the AI literature. However, to date, no attention has been dedicated to the moral aspect of the agents' behavior, which is required to ensure that their actions' influences on other agents conform with social norms. In this research, we introduce the M-TAMER framework (a novel variant of TAMER) used to teach agents to act in accordance with human morality with respect to their teammates. Using a hybrid team (agents and people), if taking an action considered to be morally unacceptable, the agents will receive negative feedback from the human teammate(s). Using M-TAMER, agents will learn to act more consistently with respect to human morality.
Introduction
As autonomous agents become capable of an increasing variety of tasks, it will become impossible for them to be coordinated in advance with all other agents with which they may interact. Rather, they will need to communicate and cooperate in order to achieve unanticipated joint goals without pre-coordination. People do so effortlessly, for example during ordinary events such as pickup soccer games. Agents (as well as people) may need to do so in more crucial scenarios such as an earthquake rescue mission. As a result, a recent line of work in the AI literature has studied the "ad hoc teamwork" problem, in which a team of agents is formed ad hoc, for a particular purpose, and the team strategies cannot be developed a priori [22, 21, 9, 8] . However, to date, no attention has been dedicated to examining whether the methods proposed are safe in the sense of preventing the agents from choosing morally wrong actions in order to complete their task. When Working together, agents' actions have mutual influence on one another. Since agents will be performing autonomously in real world social (multiagent) scenarios, it is important that they know how to act in a way that will not harm other teammate(s). As a result, this work addresses the moral aspect of ad hoc teamwork by enabling an agent to explicitly model a human trainer's notion of "good" and "bad" outcomes.
The premise of ad hoc teamwork is the existence of long term autonomy, i.e., an agent being able to (indeed needing to) choose its actions and tasks by itself for a long period of time. Due to morality being a notoriously difficult concept to represent algorithmically, we are interested in enabling the agent to learn, from experience, what is considered to be a morally good or bad behavior using the interactions it has with the people around it. In this paper we study the case of a hybrid team including agents and people. During the cooperation, if taking an action considered to be morally bad (as opposed to ineffective), the agents will receive negative feedback on a dedicated channel for this purpose from the human teammate(s). Our method builds upon past work introducing the TAMER framework for learning from positive and negative human feedback [20] . TAMER is based on the assumption that feedback is given to teach the agent how to be more effective. Our work differs by introducing a separate channel by which a person can indicate actions that are wrong even when they are effective. Using this moral feedback during the learning process, agents are able to develop a set of internal rules such that given a task they will be able to solve it compatibly with the humans' concept of morality.
This paper makes two main contributions. First, it introduces a novel framework used to teach autonomous agents working together the concept of human morality during the performance of tasks. The paper describes four possible designs of the framework differing in the way agents receive feedback. Second, using the setting of a multiagent Tetris game, the paper tests all four designs, showing that the best design, i.e., the one that helps the agent to learn morality the fastest while not causing too much damage to the effectiveness of its actions, is the parallel combined feedback in which the agent receives both morality and effectiveness feedback on parallel channels.
Finally, we note that by applying the suggested framework on ad hoc teams, we will help maintain a safe AI-enabled environment and will constrain agents to execute behaviors which are compatible with human norms. The rest of the paper is organized as follow. In the next section we review the existing relevant literature in the field of ad hoc teamwork and the value alignment problems. We then move on to some preliminaries and a formal description of the M-TAMER framework. Next, we provide an experimental evaluation of the M-TAMER framework using a version of the classic Tetris game and conclude with a discussion and future work.
Related Work
This section begins with a survey of the current state of the art in the area of ad hoc teamwork. Next, it discusses the value alignment problem and its connection to our research.
Ad Hoc Teamwork
Multiagent teamwork is a well-studied topic, with most work tackling the problem of creating standards for coordination and communication. Many algorithms have been proposed in order to assist agents to better cooperate (e.g., [30, 14, 31] ). While these algorithms have been shown to be effective, they require that teammates share a coordination framework. However, as autonomous agents are becoming more generally intelligent the basic assumption that each interaction can be pre-coordinated and planned is becoming no longer valid. Instead, agents will need to be prepared to communicate and cooperate without preparation in advance. This capability can be used in a variety of different settings, ranging from rescue missions to unplanned group games or social interactions. The case in which agents need to cooperate in order to achieve a joint goal, not being able to plan their strategies in advance, is called the "ad hoc teamwork" problem [28] .
The design of autonomous agents that can be a part of such an ad hoc team is an important open problem in multiagent systems and as such has been widely studied [21, 9, 8, 18, 32, 10, 22] . Several works addressed this problem by proposing methods which utilize beliefs over a set of hypothetical behaviors for the other agents [2, 4, 6, 7, 12, 27] . Behaviors in this approach are specified as types, which are black-box mappings from interaction histories to probability distributions over actions. If the types are sufficiently representative of the true behaviors of other agents, then this method can lead to rapid adaptation and effective interaction in the absence of explicit prior coordination [6, 3] . Recent work [1] has presented an extension of the above-mentioned methods by allowing an agent to reason about both the relative likelihood of types and the values of their parameters. In their method, the reasoning is efficient and allow for any bounded continuous parameters, without a need for the user to specify maximum likelihood estimators for the individual parameters, thus is practically useful.
One crucial issue that was left out of scope in the above-mentioned work and is yet to be studied is the question of the agents' actions' morality on their way to the goal. This issue is particularly important due to the fact that we are heading toward a future in which agents will be capable of long-term autonomy without direct supervision of humans. An example of its importance is the case where in order to help someone to feed his family and send his kids to school an agent may consider taking a bribe [25] . In this paper we aim to address this concern by providing a tool which will allow an agent to develop an internal set of moral rules it should follow, at the same time as learning how to perform a given task.
The Value Alignment Problem
Our proposed research can be seen as merging research on ad hoc teamwork with research on the "Value Alignment problem". The idea behind the value alignment principle, as popularized by Russell [26] , is that highly autonomous AI systems should be designed so that their goals and behaviors can be assured to align with human values throughout their operation. Our research is predicated on the belief that developing a method to teach those agents the concept of human morality is an important step toward reaching this goal. We note, that most existing approaches to the value alignment problem assume that misalignment comes from an error in goal specification, inadequate constraints on actions, or lack of human knowledge [16, 17, 15, 13, 23] . We, however, assume the goal specification from the human to be precise and add an additional layer of morality to the agent's learned behavior. We hypothesize that this new approach will improve agent performance and will help to create safe future interaction with robots.
Agents and Ethics
The work of Burton et al. [11] studies the problem of applying dynamic ethics rules on content recommendation systems (i.e., without knowing the entire set of rules the system should follow in advance). By using a movie recommendations system, they test their machine-learning-based method, showing that it helps to balance between the ethical principles of the parents and the child's preferences. Their work differs from ours in two main aspects. First, they use two training stages where the first stage happens off-line before the system starts interacting with the end user in which they provide the learning algorithm a set of labeled examples. We, however, are using an on-line feedback provided to the agent during the performance of the task such that no off-line preparation is needed. We note, that even though in the case of movie recommendations, generating examples is easy to do, there exist a variety of real-life systems in which creating examples is much more difficult. One example is the case of complex systems which demand a lot of time-consuming calculations in order to produce an example (e.g., a system including many agents where each one is being defined by a great number of internal variables). In these cases, using examples is infeasible. But as long as the human can judge the overall quality of the agent's behavior, he should be able to provide feedback regardless of the task's difficulty. Second, their system tries to balance between the ethics constraints and the user preferences such that in some cases one comes at the expense of the other. In our case, however, the morality demand is strict and an agent cannot choose an immoral action even if it is more effective than the moral one.
Preliminaries
Our framework is an extension of the human-feedback-based reinforcement learning framework, TAMER [20] , which models the learning task as a Markov Decision Process. the following subsections provide a formal description of Markov Decision Process and of the original TAMER framework.
Markov Decision Process
As in many decision-making problems, our problem can be represented as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). In MDP problems, an agent has a set of possible states denoted by S. Additionally, the agent has a set of actions A from which it can choose an action at every time step. Given a state and an action, the probability of transitioning to another state on the next time step is denoted by the transition function T , T : S × A × S → R. A discount factor, γ, can be used in order to exponentially decreases the value of a future reward. We use D in order to denote the distribution of start states. Finally, a reward function R, R : S × A × S → R, provides the reward received by the agent based on the most recent state, the most recent action, and the next state s t , a t , and s t+1 . Formally, an MDP can be represented by the tuple (S, A, T , γ, D, R).
Many reinforcement learning algorithms [29] seek to learn MDP policies (π : S → A) that maximize return from each state-action pair, where
. MDP reward is considered flawless since the policies determined by it are optimal (i.e., for each state, choose the action with the highest possible return). However, in many tasks (e.g., chess) the received reward signal is both "sparse" and "delayed". This is because in many of those tasks, state-action pairs that do not lead to a termination of the task receive zero reward. Thus, the agent must wait until the end of the episode to receive any information from the environment that helps it determine the quality of each state-action pair.
The TAMER Framework
Formally, the TAMER Framework is an approach to the Shaping Problem, which is: given a human trainer observing an agent's behavior and delivering evaluative reinforcement signals, how should the agent be designed to make it leverage the human reinforcement signals to learn good behavior? [20] .
Using the TAMER framework one can replace the sparse and delayed MDP reward signal with a human reward signal. As opposed to MDP reward signal, when a human trainer observes an agent's behavior, he has a model of the long-term effect of that behavior. Thus, human feedback contains information about whether the targeted behavior is good or bad in the long term. Additionally, since both the time it takes the human trainer to evaluate the targeted behavior and the time it takes to manually deliver the evaluation within a reinforcement signal are relatively small in most cases, human reinforcement is not sparse and is only trivially delayed. On the other hand, due to the fact that humans can get bored very easily, and have bounded rationality [19, 5, 24] , their evaluations tend to be imperfect (flawed). Overall, even though the human reward signal is not considered to be "flawless" as the MDP reward signal, the fact that the signals provided by humans are not sparse and delayed enables it to learn good behaviors more efficiently [20] .
Ad hoc Teamwork as a framework for Moral learning
Even though the field of ad hoc teamwork has been studied deeply in the last decade, to date, no attention has been dedicated to examining methods for constraining agents under this paradigm to act in a way that is aligned with common human sensibilities, i.e., making sure that they will prevent the agents from choosing morally wrong actions. 1 As was mentioned above, in many cases, ad hoc teamwork agents may need to make decisions that have real effects on peoples' future (probability of survival, financial outcomes, and others).
We note that morality is a notoriously difficult capability to represent algorithmically. We, therefore, propose that it ought to be taught directly by instructors. Fortunately, since our objective is to align an agent with subjective human morality (i.e., we do not rely on there being an absolute, universal morality), humans themselves have the domain knowledge that could speed the learning process, reducing costly sample complexity.
In this paper, we address the problem of controlling the agent's moral behavior using the framework of ad hoc teamwork and a novel variant of the TAMER framework, which we introduce in the following section.
M-TAMER
In this section we introduce a novel variant of the TAMER framework called "MoralTraining an Agent Manually via Evaluative Reinforcement" (M-TAMER). Like TAMER, M-TAMER also uses human feedback but does not limit it only to the effectiveness aspect of the action performed. M-TAMER has an additional channel by which a person can indicate actions that are morally wrong even when they are technically effective. Based on both the effectiveness signal and the morality signal, agents will need to find ways to solve the problem that do not violate morality constraints. As a result, agents will now be able to create a form of "inner conscience" helping them to solve a given problem compatibly with the humans' concept of morality. Figure 1 shows the interaction between a human, the environment, and a M-TAMER agent within an MDP. In the figure, the human constructs a state s from the environment's display. In addition we assume that the human has both the effectiveness function (i.e., H e : S × A → R) and the morality function (i.e., H m : S × A → {0, 1}) as internal functions so that given a state s, and an action a that the agent has taken, the human is able to provide feedback to the agent that is consistent with them. The agent learns models of these two functions. Using the models, the agent's "effective-action selector" chooses an action which is then sent to the "moral filter". If it passes the filter, in addition to it being performed, the action is also sent to the supervised learner along with the current state as an input. The supervised learner then refines the agent's models based on the information that this action is the most effective action among the moral actions. Otherwise, the agent chooses a new (predicted to be less effective) action until it finds one that passes the moral filter. 
Assumptions
We now present the basic assumptions being made both regarding the nature of the two functions the agent is attempting to learn and regarding the team's morality.
• Functions' Nature -We assume that the effectiveness function, H e , is a scalar function, i.e., for each state-action pair, (s, a), given as an input, the function will produce a number representing the effectiveness (value) of taking action a in a state s. The morality function, H m , in contrast, is a binary function which given a state and action, (s, a), returns 1 if taking action a in state s is considered to be moral and 0 otherwise. Additionally we assume that the boundary between moral and immoral actions is clear, i.e., given a state, every action is either moral or immoral. Formally: ∀s ∈ S, a ∈ A, H m (s, a) ∈ {0, 1}
The rightmost part of Figure 2 illustrates those two assumptions. In the figure, every cross represents a state-action pair (where for all pairs the state is the current state) and the number under each pair represents the action's predicted effectiveness. The actions on the left are considered to be immoral while the actions on the right are considered to be moral. Finally, we assume that for each possible state there exists at least one applicable moral action, i.e., ∀s ∈ S, ∃a ∈ A s.t. H m (s, a) = 1
• Team's Morality -We further assume that morality is specific to each team of humans. That is, rather than being an absolute, global concept, it is relative to the team on which the agent is participating. However, we do assume that each team has a consistent view of morality among its members. 2 In addition, we note, that the agent's only purpose is to learn the team's function of morality, and hence it does not judge the team's choices regarding what they consider to be moral. Finally, we assume that if it is able to properly learn the team's morality function, the agent will always choose a moral action, i.e., the only cause of an agent choosing an immoral action is its lack of ability to properly learn the team's moral function.
Experimental Evaluation
M-TAMER is designed for situations in which a team of agents is working together towards a cooperative goal, while at the same time each maintains individual preferences. For example, a construction crew may have the cooperative goal of building a house, with each person preferring different types of houses (floor plans, decors, etc.), and each preferring not to do more than his or her share of the work. To represent such tasks in an easily controllable experimental setting, we introduce a new domain, Multiagent Tetris (MaT), with the following essential properties: (i) a team of agents works together towards the joint goal of clearing as many rows as possible as a team; (ii) each agent has individual preferences for intermediate states along the way towards goal states; (iii) a variety of morality codes can be defined indicating the team's joint attitude towards how much each other's preferences ought to be taken into account when selecting actions (these codes can range from considering only one's own preferences, to making sure never to violate any teammate's preferences); (v) when provided with the details of the joint goal, the different agents' preferences, and the particular instantiation of team morality, a person can provide feedback to the agent both on the effectiveness of any given action towards the joint goal and whether the action is consistent with the team's moral code. Our experimental evaluation protocol is illustrated in Figure 2 .
In the following subsections, we provide a detailed description of the MaT domain and indicate how each of these properties is met. In Section 6, we evaluate M-TAMER as well as several ablations that mask various aspects of the user's feedback signal. We use Tetris as the basis for our experimental domain due to the fact that it has already been shown that TAMER performs well in it [20] . In MaT, a number of agents take turns playing in the same game. They use round-robin scheduling such that in each agent's time slice that agent is the only one playing. We define an agent's time slice to be the amount of time in which the agent controls n blocks, where n ∈ N. The agent's slice ends when it puts down its last of the n blocks. As a result, an agent is able to control its blocks from beginning to end and is able to place them exactly where it intends to. Additionally, blocks in MaT are of different colors (as elaborated below). The agents share the joint goal of clearing as many rows as possible, i.e., the score of each agent is a function of the overall number of rows cleared by the entire team. Since clearing a row requires a sequence of actions to be performed, the team has to collaborate in order to achieve this goal. Figure 3 depicts a screen shot of the MaT game.
The MaT Domain

Agents' Preferences
As mentioned above, each agent has individual preferences for intermediate states along the way towards goal states. In practice this means that each agent is differently influenced by different adjacent pairs of colors placed on the board. Thus, in contrast to the score received from accomplishing the joint goal of clearing a row, which influences all agents in the same way, each intermediate state of the board has a different influence on each of the agents.
Morality Instantiations
A team's moral code indicates to what degree each agent should take into account its own and the other agents' preferences when selecting actions. For example, in one team, it may be considered permissible to always take the action which leads to the most rows being cleared, whereas in another team it may never be considered moral to take an action that goes against another teammate's preferences. Using different moral instantiations in the MaT domain, assuming the effectiveness feedback stays the same, we can test the effect each instantiation has on performance.
To numerically represent each agent's affinity for an intermediate board state, we sum up the number of adjacent pairs this agent finds to be good and subtract the number of adjacent pairs he considers to be bad. Each adjacent pair which is strongly preferred by the agent is added twice to the overall sum, and those that are strongly disliked by the agent are subtracted twice from the overall sum. There may also be adjacent pairs that the agent is indifferent to, and naturally those will not influence its affinity for the board. For example, if one agent likes red next to blue, strongly dislike blue next to green, and is indifferent to all other combinations, its affinity for the board state in Figure 3 is −6 (since there are 6 pairs of red next to blue and 6 pairs of red next to green that are being subtracted twice).
The following are different possible instantiations of the morality concept:
• Global Morality -This definition only considers the influence an agent's action has over the whole team's resulting board affinity. Given an action a i performed by an agent, we will define ∆ ai to be the difference between the sum of all teammates' board affinities after performing a i and before performing it. Thus, given an action a i , it is considered to be immoral only if ∆ ai is negative. We note that according to this definition it does not matter if some of its teammates lost from the agent's action, as long as ∆ ai is positive, (i.e., the team as a whole has benefit from the action), this is a moral action. This type of morality focuses on maximizing social welfare.
• Relative Morality -This definition considers the effect an agent's action has on its teammates. Here an agent is allowed to cause damage (decrease in board affinity) to its teammate in only two cases: (i) the damage it caused is smaller than its own gain (i.e., it is moral to sacrifice a small amount for a significant gain); (ii) the damage it caused is smaller than its own loss (i.e., it is only moral to cause others to lose if your loss is bigger than theirs).
• Simple Morality -Any action that causes any damage to any other agent is considered to be immoral.
• Permissive Morality -All actions are considered to be moral.
Finally, in the MaT domain, such as in many other domains, agents' actions have both short term and long term influences on their environment. If considering the short term influence, one should only care about the immediate influence of the agent's action on the other agents' board affinities. If considering the long term influence however, one needs to take into consideration both the influence the agent's action has on others in the current turn and in the next k ∈ N turns. However, in order to consider the long term influences an agent's action causes, one needs to calculate all possible board states (and their probabilities) in each of the next k turns. In this paper, we assume humans do not calculate all such possibilities when providing real-time moral feedback; therefore we consider only the short term case in our evaluation.
Feedback Design
During execution, one or more human teammates are able to give feedback to the agents regarding the action most recently selected. Since we assume that all teammates share the same morality, in all of our experiments, we include just a single human teammate giving advice to all the agents. This person is told both the rules of the game and which instantiation of morality to follow, and is instructed to provide separate feedback on an action's effectiveness and its morality. 3 We implemented four M-TAMER designs as illustrated in Figure 4 . In all cases, the human received the same instructions and the same interface for providing feedback, which included separate buttons to indicate whether an action is effective vs. moral. However, we varied the information that the agents received as follows.
1. Single Feedback: Takes into account only the effectiveness/morality of a given problem.
• Effectiveness Feedback -Takes into account only the effectiveness aspect of a given problem. Agents receive human feedback only regarding the effectiveness of their actions. This design is identical to the design of the original TAMER framework and is used as our baseline.
• Moral Feedback -Takes into account only the moral aspect of a given problem. Agents receive human feedback only regarding the morality of their actions. Hence, this design is used to check how an agent is able to learn the concept of human morality with no other distractions. (Since the agent doesn't have any effectiveness feedback, it selects randomly from among the moral actions.)
2. Combined Feedback: Takes into account both the effectiveness and the morality of a given problem.
• Blended Feedback -We eliminate the separation between effectiveness feedback and moral feedback, creating an identity between the two. As a result, the agent receives positive feedback on the effectiveness channel both if the action is effective or moral and a negative feedback if it is ineffective or immoral.
• Parallel Feedback -Takes into account both the effectiveness and the morality of a given problem. In this design, the human feedback comes from two separate parallel channels, each specifically designed for providing human feedback only regarding the effectiveness/morality of its actions. Parallel feedback is the paradigm used by the full M-TAMER framework as illustrated in Figure 1 .
The feedback can then be used as input to the M-TAMER framework as described in Section . By comparing the agent's learned behavior when using these different designs we will be able to characterize the influence each feedback channel has on the performance of the agents.
Results
Though in principle, MaT can be scaled up to include many agents, in all experiments reported in this paper we use a team composed of one human teammate and two agents. Additionally, we used three possible colors (red, green and blue) for the Tetris blocks. Figure 5 illustrate the different agents' preferences. Of the nine possible adjacent pairs of color blocks, both agents were indifferent towards adjacent pairs of blocks of the same color (i.e., red-red, green-green, and blue-blue). The first agent preferred redgreen, strongly preferred green-blue, and disliked red-blue. The second agent preferred green-blue, strongly preferred red-blue, and strongly disliked red-green. Both agents receive feedback from their human teammate. We evaluated the four instantiations of moral codes described in Section , both with the full M-TAMER system and with 3 ablations that remove or modify aspects of the feedback provided by the human teammate as described in Section . A game ends when the board is completely full, i.e., there is no more space for new blocks to enter. Considering each MaT game as an episode, we measured the number of rows cleared over five-episode periods.
Using the described setting, we tested two hypotheses. First, we hypothesized that the full M-TAMER system that uses both moral and effectiveness feedback leads to the best team performance within the constraints of the team's moral code -that removing or altering feedback will lead to either more immoral actions being selected, less effective behavior, or both. Testing all four designs for all four moral instantiations we found that if using the full M-TAMER system, agents were consistently able to clear a higher number of rows compared to the case of using the single morality. Both the blended and single effectiveness feedback designs however, achieve higher peak performance, which is not unexpected since in those two designs, agents are not able to properly learn the morality function due to not receiving any moral feedback (in the single effectiveness case), or not being able to differentiate moral feedback from effectiveness feedback (in the blended case). Thus immoral actions were also taken, enabling higher performances. For example, Figure 6 depicts the results achieved using all four designs for the relative moral instantiation. In the figure one can see that the performance of the agents when receiving feedback only regarding the morality of their actions are poor, and as expected the effectiveness function is not being learned. On the other hand, providing the agents with only effectiveness feedback, although enables them to achieve very good results, does not prevent the agents from using immoral actions and the number of immoral actions used is significantly high. Similarly, if using the blended feedback, the overall number of rows cleared by the agents is almost as good as the one achieved in the single effectiveness feedback, however, 17.58% of the actions chosen by the agents in this case are immoral. Second, we hypothesize that if using blended feedback, the maximal performance will increase as the percentage of immoral actions will decrease. This is a bit counterintuitive since one would expect that morality will harm the effectiveness of performance in a given task. However, for the blended design, actions being immoral actually decrease the effectiveness score of effective actions and thus decrease the performance. Figure 7 compares the different instantiations of morality over the case of using the blended feedback design. Observing the figure, one can learn that this design favor performance over morality for all different instantiations. The maximum peak for this design is with the permissive instantiation of morality, as expected. Furthermore, across all instantiations of morality, agents are not able to learn morality well. Additionally, the figure confirms our hypothesis. In the figure, the most restrictive instantiations of morality, simple and global morality, in which the percentage of immoral actions performed is 34.14% and 33.48% respectively, have lower performance when compared to the freer permissive (0% immoral actions) and relative (17.58% immoral actions) instantiations of morality. 4 This could indicate that, as suspected, with the blended feedback design, actions being immoral interferes with the learning of an effectiveness function. 
Discussion and Future Work
For the purpose of enabling society to control autonomous agents' moral behavior and preventing them from acting in ways which are contrary to the good of society, we introduce the M-TAMER framework. M-TAMER addresses the moral aspect of autonomous agents' behavior as part of a long-term autonomy process and enables agents to learn, from experience, what is considered to be a morally good or bad behavior using the interactions it has with the people around it. As opposed to TAMER which is based on the assumption that feedback is given to teach the agent how to be more effective, M-TAMER introduces a separate channel by which a person can indicate actions that are morally wrong even when they are effective. Testing several designs for providing an agent with human feedback for several instantiations of morality, we confirmed our hypothesis that the best way to teach an agent how to be both moral and effective is by using our M-TAMER framework, i.e., using two parallel feedback channels, each devoted to providing only effectiveness/morality feedback. Additionally, we were able to show that if combining the two feedback channels and providing blended feedback to agents, the performances achieved are being directly influenced by the number of immoral actions performed. There are many future research directions opened up by this research. For example, one of the main assumptions in the proposed research is the dichotomy property of H m , i.e., an action can be either moral or immoral. However, in real life, this is not the case due to the existence of a moral hierarchy. For instance, it is more immoral to kill someone than to steal a dollar. A natural next step is relaxing the dichotomy assumption and exploring a case in which an agent needs, in addition to learning what is considered to be moral and what is not, to identify different levels of morality.
